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We study how different regimes of access rights to renewable natural resources – namely
open access versus full property rights – affect sustainability, growth and welfare in the
context of modern endogenous growth theory. Resource exhaustion may occur under
both regimes but is more likely to arise under open access. Moreover, under full property
rights, positive resource rents increase expenditures on manufacturing goods and
temporarily accelerate productivity growth, but also yield a higher resource price at least
in the short-to-medium run. We characterize analytically and quantitatively the model's
dynamics to assess the welfare implications of differences in property rights enforcement.
& 2015 Published by Elsevier B.V.1. Introduction
We study how different regimes of access rights to renewable natural resources affect sustainability and welfare in the
context of modern endogenous growth theory. There is a long tradition in resource economics of studying access rights in partial
equilibrium. The benchmark bioeconomic model – pioneered by Gordon (1954) and Schaefer (1954), and fully characterized by
Clark (1973) – typically considers the two polar cases of open access, in which the resource is accessible to atomistic harvesters
that do not control the evolution of the aggregate resource stock, and full property rights, in which the sole owner, or a
coordinated group of harvesters, controls the resource stock and therefore adjusts the time profile of harvesting to the dynamics
of the resource base. The most popular result, known as the Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin, 1968), is that open access may
induce resource exhaustion because atomistic harvesters maximize current rents neglecting the effects of current harvesting on
future resource scarcity. Related contributions emphasize that when both regimes yield positive resource stocks in the long run,
the levels attained under different regimes depend on the specification of harvesting costs and discount rates (Zellner, 1962;
Plourde, 1970). Importantly, because this literature focuses on partial-equilibrium models, its results are highly sensitive to the
assumption that prices and the interest rate are exogenous (Clark, 2005).
The Gordon–Schaefer–Clark bioeconomic model has been seldom studied in the general equilibrium framework of
modern growth theory. Consequently, we still lack a satisfactory treatment of the dependence of growth on access rights.
This gap in the existing literature motivates our analysis.x: +1 919 684 8974.
phaphiphat), peretto@econ.duke.edu (P.F. Peretto), simonevalente75@gmail.com (S. Valente).
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1993) and Ayong Le Kama (2001). Both introduce renewable resources and pollution in the neoclassical Solow–Ramsey
model and study the interactions between harvesting and negative externalities. Bovenberg and Smulders (1995) analyze
the same issues in the context of endogenous growth. Our analysis departs from these contributions in two fundamental
respects. First, we abstract from pollution externalities and provide, instead, a detailed comparison of open access and full
property rights over a renewable resource that exclusively plays the role of essential production input. Second, we employ a
Schumpeterian model of endogenous growth in which different types of innovations coexist.
In our framework productivity growth stems from innovations pursued by incumbent firms as well as by new firms
entering the market.1 Incumbent firms invest in projects aimed at increasing their own total factor productivity (vertical
innovation). At the same time, entrants invest in projects that develop new products and set up production and marketing
operations to serve the market (horizontal innovation). The rationale for using this approach is three-fold. First, this class of
models is receiving strong empirical support in explaining historical patterns of innovation activity and economic growth
(Madsen, 2010; Madsen and Timol, 2011). Second, the interaction between the mass of firms and technological change
within the firm eliminates scale effects – that is, long-run growth rates do not depend on the size of endowments – a
property that is empirically plausible (Laincz and Peretto, 2006; Ha and Howitt, 2007) and is furthermore realistic in the
present context where input endowments include a stock of natural resources. Third, the model is analytically tractable, a
highly desirable feature in the present context. A major reason for the lack of general-equilibrium analyses of access rights
and economic growth is, as Brown (2000) put it, that “ Introducing one more differential equation to account for renewable
resource dynamics makes it difficult to get general analytical solutions and much of the profession continues to find it
tasteless to rely on computer-aided answers”. Our model yields a detailed characterization of the dynamics of the resource
stock, income levels and productivity growth, both in the transition and in the long run. This allows us to compare
equilibrium paths under both regimes and to obtain three sets of results.
The first set of results concerns the effect of property right regimes on resource scarcity and sustainable resource use.
Both regimes may yield resource exhaustion or sustained growth in the long run, but the condition for long-run
sustainability is always more restrictive under open access: if the intrinsic regeneration rate of the natural resource falls
within a specific interval of values, the economy experiences the Tragedy of the Commons under open access but sustained
resource extraction – and, hence, sustainable economic growth – under full property rights. When natural regeneration is
sufficiently intense to induce sustained growth under both regimes, the resource stock is always higher under full property
rights. Importantly, this last result does not imply that the resource price is necessarily lower under full property rights. The
reason is that, in our model, the equilibrium value of resource rents is affected by both resource scarcity and income
dynamics and – contrary to standard partial equilibrium models – income dynamics are driven by endogenous productivity
growth. Specifically, full property rights induce a downward pressure on prices via scarcity effects (i.e., the resource stock
tends to be preserved relatively to open access) as well as an upward pressure on prices via rent effects (i.e., resource
harvesters with full ownership charge a higher price for given quantity).
The second set of results concerns the impact of resource property rights on market size, innovations and productivity
growth. We show that, under full property rights, the market for manufacturing goods is always larger because strictly
positive resource rents yield additional income that boost household spending. A larger market size, in turn, attracts
entrants so that the economy converges to a steady state with a larger mass of firms. Productivity growth, however, is not
faster because the process of entry in the manufacturing sector sterilizes the scale effect: in the long run, firm size and
growth rates are the same in the two regimes.
The third set of results concerns the overall effect on consumption and welfare of a regime switch. A shift from full
property rights to open access generates negative transitional effects – namely a productivity slowdown and a gradual
increase of natural resource scarcity – but also instantaneous level effects having a potentially ambiguous impact on
consumption levels: the permanent reduction in expenditure is mitigated by a reduction in the resource price, because open
access implies zero net rents from harvesting and thereby lower unit cost for resource inputs. Therefore, switching to open
access is welfare reducing only if the utility gain generated by the initial drop in the resource price is more than offset by the
static and dynamic losses induced by lower expenditures and transitional growth.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the model setup. Section 3 derives the general equilibrium
relationships that characterize the economy under each regime. Section 4 compares the two regimes in terms of equilibrium
outcomes and studies the welfare impact of a regime switch. Section 5 concludes.2. A model of renewable resources and endogenous growth
The supply side of the economy comprises a final sector producing the consumption good, a manufacturing sector
producing differentiated intermediate inputs, and a resource sector that supplies harvest goods to final producers. In the
manufacturing sector, incumbents invest in R&D that raise own productivity (i.e., vertical innovations) while outside1 The framework, pioneered by Peretto (1998) and Peretto and Connolly (2007), has been recently applied to study the role of resources in fixed supply
– like, e.g., land – in a closed economy (Peretto, 2012) and in a two-country, world general equilibrium model with asymmetric trade (Peretto and Valente,
2011). In this paper we extend it to the case of renewable resources.
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innovations). The resource sector may operate under two different regimes – open access or full property rights – that
determine different time paths of resource rents and income levels as a result of households choices.
2.1. Final producers
A representative competitive firm produces final output, Y, by means of H units of a “harvest good” drawn from a stock of
a renewable natural resource, LY units of labor and n differentiated manufacturing goods. The technology is
YðtÞ ¼HðtÞαLY ðtÞβ
Z nðtÞ
0
XiðtÞγ di; αþβþγ ¼ 1; ð1Þ
where Xi is the quantity of manufacturing good i and tA 0;1½ Þ is the time index. The final producer demands inputs
according to the usual conditions equating value marginal productivities to remuneration rates. The demand schedules for
labor and resource read
LY tð Þ ¼ β
PY ðtÞYðtÞ
WðtÞ ; ð2Þ
H tð Þ ¼ αPY ðtÞYðtÞ
PHðtÞ
; ð3Þ
where PY is the price of final output, W is the wage rate, and PH is the resource price. The condition for Xi yields
Xi tð Þ ¼
γPY ðtÞHðtÞαLY ðtÞβ
PXiðtÞ
" #1=ð1γÞ
; iA 0;nðtÞ½ ; ð4Þ
where PXi is the price of good i.
2.2. Manufacturing sector: incumbents
The manufacturing sector consists of single-product firms that supply differentiated goods under monopolistic
competition. The typical firm produces with the technology
XiðtÞ ¼ ZiðtÞθ  LXiðtÞϕ
 
; 0oθo1; ϕ40 ð5Þ
where Zi is the firm-specific knowledge, θ is the associated elasticity parameter, LXi is labor employed in manufacturing
production and ϕ is a fixed labor cost. In technology (5), firm's productivity may increase over time by virtue of in-house
R&D. Specifically, the firm's knowledge grows according to
_Z iðtÞ ¼ κ  KðtÞLZiðtÞ; κ40 ð6Þ
where κ is an exogenous parameter, LZi is labor employed in vertical R&D, and K is the stock of public knowledge available to
all manufacturing firms. Public knowledge is the average knowledge in the manufacturing industry
K tð Þ ¼ 1
nðtÞ
Z nðtÞ
0
Zj tð Þ dj; ð7Þ
which is taken as given at the firm level.2 The firm maximizes
ViðtÞ ¼
Z 1
t
ΠXiðsÞe
R s
t
rðvÞþδð Þdv ds; δ40 ð8Þ
subject to (6) and (7) and the demand schedule (4), where ΠXi ¼ PXiXiWLXiWLZi is the instantaneous profit, r is the
interest rate and δ is the exogenous death rate. The solution to this problem, derived in the Appendix, yields a symmetric
equilibrium where each firm produces the same output level and captures the same fraction 1=n of the market:
PXi tð ÞXi tð Þ ¼
1
nðtÞ  γPY tð ÞY tð Þ; ð9Þ
where γPYY is the final producer's expenditure on manufacturing goods.
2.3. Manufacturing sector: entrants
Entrepreneurs develop new products and set up new firms to serve the market. This process of horizontal innovations
increases the mass of firms over time and the growth rate of n depends on how much labor is employed in start-up
operations. For each entrant, denoted i without loss of generality, the labor requirement translates into a sunk cost that is2 Peretto and Smulders (2002) provide microeconomic foundations for the knowledge aggregator (7).
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cost equals
WðtÞLNiðtÞ ¼ψPXiðtÞXiðtÞ; ψ40 ð10Þ
where PiXi is the value of production of the new good when it enters the market and ψ is a parameter representing
technological opportunity. This assumption captures the notion that entry requires more the effort the larger the anticipated
volume of production.3 A free-entry equilibrium requires that the value of the new firm equals the entry cost, that is,
ViðtÞ ¼ψPXiðtÞXiðtÞ: ð11Þ
In symmetric equilibrium the mass of firms grows according to
_nðtÞ
nðtÞ ¼
1
ψγ
WðtÞLNðtÞ
PY ðtÞYðtÞ
δ; ð12Þ
where LN is the total employment in entry (see the Appendix).
2.4. Resource dynamics
The resource stock, S, obeys the regeneration equation
_SðtÞ ¼ GðSðtÞÞHðtÞ; ð13Þ
where GðÞ is natural regeneration and H is harvesting. Following the benchmark model of renewable resources pioneered by
Schaefer (1954), we assume that the regeneration function takes the logistic form
G S tð Þð Þ ¼ ηS tð Þ  1SðtÞ
S
 
; η40; S40 ð14Þ
where η is the intrinsic regeneration (or growth) rate and S is the carrying capacity of the habitat, i.e., the maximum level of
the resource stock that the natural environment sustains when there is no harvesting.
The harvesting technology is
HðtÞ ¼ BLHðtÞ  SðtÞ; B40 ð15Þ
where B is a productivity parameter also known as the “catchability coefficient” and LH is the amount of labor employed in
harvesting.4 Employment in harvesting is determined by the choices of the households, who behave like atomistic extractive
firms and earn a flow of resource rents given by
ΠSðtÞ ¼ PHðtÞHðtÞWðtÞLHðtÞ; ð16Þ
where PH is the price of the harvest good.
2.5. Household behavior and access rights
We consider a representative household endowed with L units of labor that it can either sell in the market for the wage
W or use to produce the harvest good that it can then sell in the market for the price PH. The household has preferences
U 
Z 1
0
log CðtÞ  eρt dt; ρ40 ð17Þ
where C(t) is the consumption and ρ is the discount rate. Financial wealth, A, consists of ownership claims on firms that
yield a rate of return r. The budget constraint reads
_AðtÞ ¼ rðtÞAðtÞþWðtÞLþ PHðtÞBSðtÞWðtÞ½   LHðtÞ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
ΠSðtÞ ¼ resource rents
PY ðtÞCðtÞ; ð18Þ
where the term in square brackets follows from (15) and (16). The household chooses the time paths of consumption, C, and
employment in harvesting, LH, to maximize (17) subject to (18). The choice over LH depends on the regime of access rights.3 See Etro (2004) and, in particular, Peretto and Connolly (2007) for a more detailed discussion of the microfoundations of our assumption. They argue
that the entry cost is proportional to the initial variable cost of production because a firm setting up operations incurs the cost of building prototypes of the
new products. In symmetric equilibrium (see below) our formulation yields an entry cost equal to ψy=n (where y PYY). Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004,
Chapter 6) use this assumption to eliminate the scale effect and argue that it is empirically appropriate: the available evidence suggests that rates of
innovation are functions of R&D intensity, not of the absolute flow of resources devoted to R&D.
4 This production function, originally due to Schaefer (1954), exhibits returns to scale of degree two in labor and the resource stock. Following the
exhaustive discussion in Brown (2000), we use it for two reasons. First, it is used as is in much of the literature (for both empirical and theoretical reasons)
and we follow the practice to make our results directly comparable to the state of the art. Second, modifying it to allow for constant returns does not
change our results in any substantial way.
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household problem, and the Hamiltonian reads
Loa  log CðtÞþλaðtÞ _AðtÞ; ð19Þ
where λa is the marginal shadow value of financial wealth. The first-order condition with respect to LH then yields
maximization of current resource rents.
Under full property rights, instead, the household has full control over the resource stock and maximizes the present
value of the stream of benefits in a forward-looking manner: Eq. (13) is an explicit constraint in the optimization problem
and S is an additional state variable. Consequently, the current-value Hamiltonian reads
Lpr  log CðtÞþλaðtÞ _AðtÞþλsðtÞ _SðtÞ; ð20Þ
where λs is the marginal shadow value of the resource stock.
3. General equilibrium
Open access and full property rights yield different harvesting plans, which, in equilibrium, induce different dynamics of
consumption and innovation-led growth. Before analyzing in detail the two regimes, we describe the general equilibrium
relations that hold in the economy independently of the type of access rights on natural resources. All the expressions
discussed below are derived in the Appendix.
3.1. Main features of the equilibrium
The economy allocates labor across five activities: final production, manufacturing production, firm-specific knowledge
accumulation (vertical R&D), entry (horizontal R&D), and resource harvesting. Because we have assigned the decision
concerning employment in harvesting to the household, we have in fact modeled the household as determining labor
supply as LLH . Consequently, the labor market clearing condition is
LLHðtÞ ¼ LY ðtÞþLXðtÞþLZðtÞþLNðtÞ; ð21Þ
where LX and LZ denote, respectively, total employment in production and vertical R&D. Labor mobility yields wage
equalization across all activities. We take labor as the numeraire and set WðtÞ  1. We also denote expenditure on
manufacturing goods by y PYY .
The market for the final good clears when output equals consumption, YðtÞ ¼ CðtÞ. The household problem yields the
Euler equation for consumption growth
_PY ðtÞ
PY ðtÞ
þ
_C ðtÞ
CðtÞ ¼
_yðtÞ
yðtÞ ¼ r tð Þρ: ð22Þ
From (8), the return to financial assets is
r tð Þ ¼ΠXðtÞ
VðtÞ þ
_V ðtÞ
VðtÞδ: ð23Þ
The free-entry condition yields that financial wealth – the aggregate value of firms – is a constant fraction of the value of
final output
AðtÞ ¼ nðtÞVðtÞ ¼ψγ  yðtÞ: ð24Þ
Equilibrium of the financial market requires that all rates of return be equal.
As discussed in detail in Peretto (1998) and Peretto and Connolly (2007), models of this class have well-defined dynamics
also when one of the two R&D activities shuts down because it is return-dominated by the other, or even when they both
shut down because they fail to generate the household's reservation rate of return on saving. For simplicity, we focus our
analysis on the case in which both types of innovation are active and discuss the role of corner solutions in the Appendix.
The growth rate of firm-specific knowledge is
_Z ðtÞ
ZðtÞ ¼ κθγ  γ
yðtÞ
nðtÞ
 
 rðtÞþδ : ð25Þ
Eq. (25) shows that larger firm size γy=n increases the typical firm's vertical R&D effort, boosting productivity growth. The
gross growth rate of the mass of firms is
_nðtÞ
nðtÞþδ¼
1γψρ
ψ
 nðtÞ
γyðtÞ 
1
ψ
 ϕþ1
κ

_Z ðtÞ
ZðtÞ
 !
: ð26Þ
The last term in (26) highlights that firm-specific knowledge accumulation reduces the expansion rate of product variety
because it raises the anticipated post-entry expenditure on vertical innovation.
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(24) implies that expenditure is a constant fraction of labor and resource income
y tð Þ ¼ 1
1ρψγ  LþΠSðtÞð Þ: ð27Þ
Different regimes of access rights over resources yield different dynamics of resource rents and, hence, of consumption
expenditure. This mechanism has crucial implications for growth and welfare, as we show in the next section.3.2. Equilibrium under open access
Under open access, the household chooses employment in harvesting in order to maximize current rents, while
competition forces the price of the harvest good down to the marginal harvesting cost and thus resource rents to zero. From
the Hamiltonian (19), we have
PoaH tð Þ ¼
1
BSoaðtÞ⟹Π
oa
S tð Þ ¼ 0: ð28Þ
From (27), this constant time profile of resource income yields an equilibrium with constant expenditure on the final good
which, via the saving rule (22), yields that the interest rate equals the discount rate
yoa tð Þ ¼ yoa  L
1ψγρ and r
oa tð Þ ¼ ρ: ð29Þ
This result has important implications for harvesting and innovation.
Proposition 1. (Natural resource dynamics under Open Access) Harvesting is proportional to the existing resource stock:
HoaðtÞ
SoaðtÞ ¼ αBy
oa ¼ αBL
1ψγρ: ð30Þ
The regeneration equation (13) becomes
_S
oa
tð Þ ¼ η αBL
1ψγρ
 
 Soaη
S
 Soa 2; ð31Þ
and yields
lim
t-1
Soa tð Þ ¼ Soass 
S
η
 η αBL
1ψγρ
 
if η4ηoa  αBL
1ψγρ
0 if ηrηoa
8><
>: : ð32Þ
There exists a condition on the parameters determining whether the economy experiences natural resource exhaustion
or it reaches a steady state with a positive stock. The condition for long-run preservation, η4ηoa, says that the intrinsic
regeneration rate η must be sufficiently high to compensate for the adverse effects of consumers' impatience (a high ρ
boosts current consumption and thereby harvesting), resource dependency in production (a high α yields a large demand
for the harvesting good), efficiency in harvesting (a high B raises the incentive to hire workers in harvesting), and the size of
the population (a high L also raises the incentive to hire workers in harvesting). For ηrηoa the open-access economy
experiences the Tragedy of the Commons: the rent-maximizing harvesting rule is unsustainable and the resource stock
eventually vanishes.
The equilibrium paths of the innovation rates are as follows.
Proposition 2. (Innovation dynamics under Open Access) The rate of accumulation of firm-specific knowledge is
_Z
oaðtÞ
ZoaðtÞ ¼ κθγ 
γyoa
noaðtÞ ρþδ
 
: ð33Þ
The mass of firms follows a logistic process with constant coefficients:
_noaðtÞ
noaðtÞ ¼ ν  1
noaðtÞ
~noa
 
; ν 1γθγψ ðρþδÞ
ψ
ð34Þ
where ν is the intrinsic growth rate, and
~noa  γyoa  1γθγψ ðρþδÞ
ϕðρþδÞ  κ1 : ð35Þ
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noass  limt-1n
oaðtÞ ¼ ~noa:
One implication of Proposition 2 is that the engine of growth in the long run is firm-specific knowledge accumulation.
Entry generates transitional dynamics in the mass of firms but, due to the fixed operating cost ϕ, it is not self-sustaining.
Consequently, in steady state the rate of entry exactly compensates for the death rate of firms δ. The long-run mass of firms
nss
oa
, on the other hand, determines long-run firm size, γyoa=noass , and thus long-run growth. The interpretation is that, at any
point in time, the equilibrium of factors market and the consumption/saving decision of the household determine
the size of the market for manufacturing goods, γyoa. This, in turn, determines the carrying capacity in the logistic
equation characterizing the equilibrium proliferation of firms. Peretto and Connolly (2007) discuss in detail the intuition for
why these logistic dynamics arise in a broad class of models and how they relate to the literature. The reason why these
models exhibit logistic, instead of exponential, growth of the mass of firms is that they (re)introduce the fixed
operating costs of the static theory of product variety that first-generation endogenous growth models set to zero.5 In
this paper's specific application of the Schumpeterian framework, the finite amounts of labor and of the natural resource are
the force that limits the proliferation of a “ specie” – firms/products – through the crowding effect implied by the fixed
operating cost.3.3. Equilibrium under full property rights
Under full property rights, resource owners do not maximize current rents at each point in time but rather the present-
discounted value of all rents in a forward-looking fashion. As a consequence, harvesting satisfies the Hotelling rule: the
marginal net rent must grow over time at the rate of interest net of the marginal benefits from resource regeneration.6 We
show this result in the Appendix. Here, we focus on the components of the household harvesting plan that identify the key
channels through which such plan affects macroeconomic outcomes.
First, resource rents are strictly positive because the household chooses the extraction path so to equalize the profits
from harvesting to the marginal shadow value of the resource stock
ΠprS ðtÞ ¼ yprðtÞ  λ
pr
s ðtÞHprðtÞ: ð36Þ
Second, the resource price is
PprH tð Þ ¼
1
BSprðtÞþy
prðtÞ  λprs ðtÞ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
scarcity rent
: ð37Þ
Third, from (27) and (36) we obtain
ypr tð Þ ¼ L
1ρψγλprs ðtÞHprðtÞ
: ð38Þ
According to these expressions, resource rents are not a constant fraction of consumption expenditure because the
incentives to harvest depend on the marginal shadow value of the resource stock. As a consequence, full property rights
induce an equilibrium path where expenditure and the interest rate are time-varying. The reason is that, differently from
the open access regime, the level of harvesting under full property rights is not proportional to the resource stock in each
instant: since the harvesting choices of forward-looking resource owners take into account the effect of natural scarcity on
future rents, the economy's rate of return continuously adjusts to the dynamics of resource rents generated at each point
in time.
We can study the equilibrium path of the economy by constructing a two-by-two system that governs the joint dynamics
of the shadow value of the resource stock, mðtÞ  λprs ðtÞSprðtÞ, and the physical resource stock, SprðtÞ.
Proposition 3. (Natural resource dynamics under Full Property Rights) Harvesting is a monotonously decreasing function of the
shadow value of the resource stock
Hpr
Spr
¼Λ mð Þ  2αBL
1ρψγþBLmþ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1ρψγþBLm 24αBLmq : ð39Þ5 Setting ϕ¼ 0 in (34) yields that the mass of firms does not follow a logistic process anymore but grows forever, exactly like in expanding-varieties
models à la Grossman and Helpman (1991).
6 The Hotelling rule – named after Hotelling (1931) – asserts that an efficient harvesting plan requires that the growth rate of the marginal net rents
from harvesting equal the interest rate minus the shadow value of all the positive feedback effects that a marginal increase in the resource stock induces on
current rents and on future consumption benefits from resource use. If the resource is non-renewable and harvesting costs are independent of the resource
stock, the feedback effects are zero and the Hotelling rule asserts that the growth rate of the marginal net rents from harvesting equal the interest rate.
Fig. 1. Dynamics under full property rights according to Proposition 3. Left graph: the case η4ηpr implies positive resource stock in the long run. Right
graph: the case ηoηpr leads to long-run resource exhaustion.
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equation (13) evaluated at the harvesting rule (39)
_mðtÞ
mðtÞ ¼ ρþ
η
S
Spr tð Þ α
mðtÞ; ð40Þ
_S
prðtÞ
SprðtÞ ¼ η
η
S
Spr tð ÞΛ m tð Þð Þ: ð41Þ
The system is saddle-path stable and converges to
lim
t-1
m tð Þ ¼mss 
α
ρþ η=S

 
Sprss
if η4ηpr Λ mssð Þ
α
ρ
if ηrηpr
8>><
>>: ;
lim
t-1
Spr tð Þ ¼ Sprss 
S
η
 ηΛ mssð Þ
 
if η4ηpr Λ mssð Þ
0 if ηrηpr
8><
>: : ð42Þ
Fig. 1 illustrates the dynamics in the two cases: η4ηpr yields positive resource stock in the steady state (left diagram)
whereas ηoηpr leads to resource exhaustion (right diagram). The condition for long-run resource preservation is
conceptually analogous to that obtained under open access: if the intrinsic regeneration rate is too low, resource exhaustion
occurs. However, the intrinsic regeneration rate triggering exhaustion under full property rights, ηpr Λ mssð Þ, differs from
that obtained under open access, ηoa. We discuss this point in detail in Section 4.
The convergence results in (42) imply that consumption expenditure and the interest rate are constant in the long run:
from (38) and (22), we obtain
lim
t-1
ypr tð Þ ¼ yprss 
L
1ψγρmssΛ mssð Þ
and lim
t-1
rpr tð Þ ¼ ρ: ð43Þ
In light of these results, we can characterize the dynamics of innovation as follows.
Proposition 4. (Innovation dynamics under Full Property Rights) The rate of accumulation of firm-specific knowledge is
_Z
prðtÞ
ZprðtÞ ¼ κθγ 
γyprðtÞ
nprðtÞ  r
prðtÞþδ :
The mass of firms follows the logistic process with time-varying carrying capacity
_nprðtÞ
nprðtÞ ¼ ν  1
nprðtÞ
~nprðtÞ
 
; ν 1γθγψ ρþδ
 
ψ
where ν is the intrinsic growth rate, and
~npr tð Þ  γypr tð Þ  1γθγψ ðρþδÞ
ϕ rprðtÞþδ   κ1
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nprss  limt-1n
pr tð Þ ¼ lim
t-1
~npr tð Þ ¼ γyprss 
1γθγψ ρþδ 
ϕðρþδÞ  κ1 : ð44Þ
Proposition 4 can be interpreted along similar lines as Proposition 2: the mass of firms follows a logistic process
converging towards a stable carrying-capacity level nss
pr
. As we noted above, the finite amounts of labor and of the natural
resource limit the proliferation of a “ specie” – firms/products – that would otherwise grow exponentially. Unlike the open-
access regime, the carrying capacity of firms changes over time due to agents' internalization of the dynamics of the natural
resource stock. More generally, human activity – i.e., harvesting – affects the evolution of the resource stock by modifying
the habitat in which it grows. The evolution of the resource stock, in turn, affects the “ economic habitat” in which firms
grow in number and size. Productivity growth in the long run is driven by vertical innovation, whose incentives depend on
firm size.
The crucial difference between the open access and the full property rights regimes is that in the former the
economy lacks a price signal of scarcity capable of inducing an adaptive response of resource extractors to the changing
habitat. This is why, under open access, resource exhaustion – which essentially represents a Tragedy of the Commons –
occurs for a larger set of values of the natural regeneration rate under open access than under full property rights, as we
show below.3.4. Resource preservation in the long run
The two regimes imply different conditions for a strictly positive resource stock in the long run. We adopt the standard
notion of strong sustainability, according to which a strictly positive resource base must be preserved forever, and interpret
such conditions for long-run preservation as conditions for sustainable development. The reason is that in our model the
renewable resource is a macro-level essential input that cannot be exhausted without collapsing the entire economy. Our
main result is the following.
Proposition 5. (Resource preservation in the long run) The condition for long-run resource preservation is more restrictive under
open access: ηproηoa. Specifically, there are three cases(i)7
harve
(1975
as th
strucFor ηproηoaoη, both regimes yield resource preservation in the long run, with
Sprss4S
oa
ss ; y
pr
ss4y
oa; nprss4n
oa
ss :(ii) For ηproηoηoa, the economy preserves the resource under full property rights (Sprss40) but experiences the Tragedy of the
Commons under open access (Soass ¼ 0).(iii) For ηoηproηoa, both regimes yield resource exhaustion in the long run.The intuition behind the first statement in Proposition 5 follows immediately from the regeneration equation (13). To
preserve the resource in the long run, the intrinsic regeneration rate η must be able to compensate for the depletion due to
harvesting. Under open access, cumulative harvesting is more intense because agents do not consider the effects of current
exploitation on future scarcity. Also, full property rights generate a higher level of expenditure that induces more intense
entry during the transition and, consequently, more firms in the intermediate sector in the long run.7 It is worth
emphasizing that in both cases the threshold for sustainability is increasing in population size. Our general equilibrium
model thus captures a crucial channel through which population size puts pressure on the natural environment. For reasons
of space we leave the analysis of the implications of this channel to future work. We stress, however, that its presence places
strong demands on studies that aim to allow for population growth since, strictly speaking, it rules out simply adding
exogenous population growth but, rather, requires the explicit modeling of the feedback from the resource stock to
population growth.
Fig. 2 illustrates the dynamics of the resource stock S(t) and of its shadow value m(t) in the three scenarios listed in
Proposition 5. The grey trajectories along the vertical axis – i.e., a zero shadow value in each instant – represent open access
whereas the black trajectories are associated with full property rights. When (i) both regimes exhibit preservation, more
intense harvesting under open access yields a lower resource stock in the long run. Alternatively, we may observe (ii) the
Tragedy of the Commons under open access, or (iii) asymptotic exhaustion in both regimes. Fig. 2 clarifies that open access isAn anonymous referee pointed out that not everything is new in expressions for the sustainability thresholds. The roles of the discount rate and
sting technology, which also appear in our paper, are well known from the literature, see e.g. the contributions of Clark (1973), Clark and Munro
; 1978). What is novel is that we now also have to check the production elasticities of the resource (α) and manufacturing (γ) for final output, as well
e entry parameter (ψ). As the referee points out, these new elements enter the sustainability threshold because of the model's General Equilibrium
ture.
Fig. 2. Regime comparison according to Proposition 5. The black bold trajectory represents full property rights. The grey bold trajectory along the vertical
axis represents open access.
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in their intertemporal choices.
3.5. Equilibrium growth rates
To discuss economic growth, we concentrate on the case where long-run preservation obtains in both regimes.8 In
equilibrium, the logarithm of consumption in each instant equals
log CðtÞ ¼ log aþ log yðtÞ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
market size
 log PHðtÞα|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
input cost
þ log nðtÞð Þ1 γðZðtÞÞθγ
h i
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
TFP
; ð45Þ
where we have defined the constant a  ααββγ2γ . This expression shows that consumption is higher the higher is the value
of final output (market-size effect), the lower is the resource price (input-cost effect), and the higher is total factor
productivity (TFP) determined by the mass of firms and by the firm-specific knowledge stock. Accordingly, the growth rate
of consumption is
g tð Þ 
_C ðtÞ
CðtÞ ¼ r tð Þρα
_PHðtÞ
PHðtÞ
þ 1γ  _nðtÞ
nðtÞþγθ
_Z ðtÞ
ZðtÞ: ð46Þ
According to this expression the economy's growth rate has three components. The first is the usual consumption rate of
return net of discounting, rðtÞρ. The second is the resource price drag, α _PH=PH , which represents the negative effect of
increased scarcity of the natural input as reflected by the dynamics of the resource price. The third component is TFP
growth, a weighted average of the two innovation rates.
In the long run, the resource stock, the harvesting rate, the interest rate and the mass of manufacturing firms are all
constant in both regimes. Consequently, the only source of consumption growth in the long run is firm-specific knowledge
growth. An important implication of Propositions 2 and 4, then, is that the economy's steady-state growth rate is the same
under open access and under full property rights.
Proposition 6. (Steady-state growth) In the long run, firm size is the same in the two regimes, i.e.
lim
t-1
γyoa
noaðtÞ ¼ limt-1
γyprðtÞ
nprðtÞ ¼
ϕðρþδÞ  κ1
1γθγψ ðρþδÞ 
γyss
nss
; ð47Þ
implying the same long-run growth rate in the two regimes
lim
t-1
g tð Þ ¼ lim
t-1
γθ
_Z ðtÞ
ZðtÞ ¼ γθ  κγθ 
γyss
nss
 ρþδ  40: ð48Þ
Growth rates coincide in the two regimes because, in our framework, long-run growth does not exhibit scale effects –
that is, the size of factor endowments does not influence the pace of development in the long run. Importantly, this8 There exist corner solutions where vertical and horizontal innovation shut down as the economy becomes smaller due to resource exhaustion. Thus,
if long-run preservation fails to hold, growth falls to zero with the level of economic activity. Discussing such dynamics is feasible but much more
cumbersome than focusing on the more interesting case that we consider in the text.
N. Suphaphiphat et al. / European Economic Review 76 (2015) 125–151 135invariance result equally applies to the labor endowment and to the natural resource stock, conferring further empirical
plausibility to this framework.9 Therefore, regimes characterized by different rates of resource exploitation yield different
income levels but equal growth rates in the long run. The reason is that the interaction between horizontal and vertical
innovations fragments the intermediate goods market into submarkets whose size does not depend on endowments:
although the long-run levels of expenditures and of the mass of firms differ between the two regimes, the size of each firm
converges to the same equilibrium level, determined by expression (47), which shows that the fragmentation process makes
long-run firm size independent of total market size. Factor endowments, therefore, do not affect the incentives to undertake
R&D in the long run because in equilibrium they work through the market size effect, which is sterilized by the entry
process in this model. Armed with these results, we can investigate in detail the role of the regime of access rights.
4. Regime comparison
In this section we compare the two regimes in four respects. First, we show that different regimes of property rights
induce contrasting effects on the equilibrium value of the resource price (Section 4.1). Second, we distinguish between
instantaneous and transitional effects of property rights regimes on consumption (Section 4.2). Third, we characterize
analytically the welfare impact of a regimes switch from full property rights to open access (Section 4.3). Fourth, we assess
the model predictions quantitatively by performing three numerical simulations that compare the two regimes in three
cases: (i) under identical initial conditions; (ii) following a switch from full property rights to open access; (iii) following a
switch from open access to full property rights (Section 4.4).
4.1. Resource price: scarcity versus rent effects
The equilibrium value of the resource price is affected by property rights regimes in two ways. First, the resource price at
a given instant reflects current scarcity – i.e., the current level of the resource stock – and different regimes entail different
degrees of resource preservation. Second, under full property rights, the resource price is also affected by income dynamics
through the rent effect – that is, forward-looking extractors with full ownership make positive profits by charging a higher
price than under open access given the same resource stock (cf. Section 3.3). The interplay between scarcity effects and rent
effects yields the following result.
Proposition 7. (Resource price in the two regimes). For a given level of the resource stock SoaðtÞ ¼ SprðtÞ ¼ SðtÞ, positive resource
rents under full property rights imply a higher resource price than under open access
PoaH tð Þ ¼
1
BSðtÞoP
pr
H tð Þ ¼
1
BSðtÞþy
prðtÞλprs ðtÞ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
Rent effect
:
In long-run equilibria with positive preservation, the resource stock is higher under full property rights, Sprss4S
oa
ss 40, but the rent
effect implies an ambiguous price gap
lim
t-1
PoaH tð Þ ¼
1
BSoass
⋛ lim
t-1
PprH tð Þ ¼
1
BSprss|ﬄ{zﬄ}
Scarcity effect
þ lim
t-1
yprðtÞλprs ðtÞ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
Rent effect
:
In general, full property rights induce an upward pressure on prices via the rent effect as well as a downward pressure
via scarcity effects. If we compare the two regimes at time zero, when the resource stock is given, the resource price is
necessarily higher under full property rights because the rent effect is fully operative and is not mitigated by scarcity effects.
As the two economies converge to their respective steady states, however, full property rights imply more intense resource
preservation (cf. Fig. 2), and the resulting scarcity effect may, but does not necessarily, determine a lower price than under
open access. The implications of this tension between scarcity and rent effects for consumption and welfare may be
substantial, as we show below.
4.2. Consumption: expenditure-price trade-off and transitional effects
Different harvesting regimes determine different paths of resource price, income and consumption. This mechanism has
two main components. The first is the expenditure-price trade-off captured by the first two terms in (45). High expenditure
levels do not necessarily imply high consumption: if the resource price is also high, the positive impact of market size may
be more than offset by the negative impact of input costs. This observation is immediately relevant to our regime
comparison. On one hand, full property rights yield higher expenditures relative to open access: from (27), positive resource9 In models where production requires the use of natural resources, the absence of scale effects is a particularly desirable property because the
available empirical evidence does not support the existence of positive relationships between growth rates and resource stocks in resource-rich countries;
e.g., see Bretschger and Valente (2012).
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possibly, in the long run (cf. Proposition 7). The expenditure-price trade-off thus suggests that full property rights do not
necessarily enhance consumption at each point in time. In particular, open access can yield higher consumption in the
short run.
The second source of consumption gaps between the two regimes is given by differences in transitional growth rates.
Expression (46) captures the relevant components. On one hand, equilibrium interest rates differ during the transition
because full property rights yield positive and time-varying profits from harvesting (cf. Section 3.3). On the other hand,
productivity growth rates differ between regimes during the transition: entry in manufacturing proceeds at different speeds
because, starting from a given initial condition nð0Þ, the mass of firms must reach different long-run levels, nsspr or nssoa, in the
two regimes.
All these mechanisms jointly determine the overall impact of property rights regimes on consumption and thereby on
present-value welfare. In particular, the expenditure-price trade-off suggests that open access is not necessary welfare-
reducing. Although open access is by definition a regime that fails to maximize present-value resource rents, it is not
possible to conclude that full property rights are always Pareto-superior because access rights interact with other market
failures – namely monopolistic competition in manufacturing and non-decreasing returns to R&D – and the favorable
impact of open access on resource prices can be substantial. The next subsection sheds further light on this issue by
characterizing analytically the welfare effects of a regime shift.4.3. Switching from property rights to open access: analytical results
Suppose that the economy is initially in the steady-state equilibrium of the full property rights regime with positive
resource stock (i.e., ηproη). At time t¼0, the economy suddenly shifts to open access – as a result of, e.g., failure in enforcing
property rights. The overall impact of the regime switch on welfare depends on the combination of the instantaneous and
transitional effects discussed below.
Instantaneous level effects: At time zero, the regime switch induces two instantaneous adjustments: expenditure jumps
down, from yss
pr
to yss
oa
, and the resource price jumps down, from PprH
 
ss ¼ 1þBy
pr
ss m
pr
ss
 
=BSprss to P
oa
H ¼ 1=BSprss . From expression
(45), the ratio between consumption levels (immediately) before and (immediately) after the switch is
Cpr 0ð Þ
Coa 0þ
 ¼ yprss
yoass
 P
oa
H 0
þ 
PprH 0
ð Þ
 !α
¼ y
pr
ss
yoass
 1
1þByprssmprss
 α
This ratio may be above or below unity in view of the expenditure-price trade-off. Hence, the overall level effect is generally
ambiguous: at the time of the regime switch, we may observe either an instantaneous drop or an instantaneous increase in
consumption.
Transitional growth effects: After time 0, there are two types of transitional effects respectively induced by productivity
growth and resource scarcity. First, there is a transitional slowdown in productivity growth via both horizontal and vertical
innovations: the switch to open access reduces the mass of firms over time (n must move from the initial state nss
pr
to the
new steady state noass onprss ) and also reduces the growth rate of firm-specific knowledge as a result of reduced expenditure.
As a consequence, the transitional growth rate of TFP after the switch is smaller than the rate enjoyed before – in fact, it may
even be negative because the mass of firms is shrinking. The second transitional effect results from increased scarcity: the
resource stock moves from the initial state Sss
pr
to Soass oSprss , and this decline increases the resource price after the initial
instantaneous drop.
Overall effect on welfare: After the switch, the consumption path generated by open access may be above or below the
baseline path – i.e., the path, characterized by permanent full property rights, that the economy would have followed
without the regime switch. The reason is the ambiguous impact of the instantaneous level effects: while the transitional
growth effects (i.e., productivity slowdown and increased scarcity) tend to reduce consumption after the regime switch, the
initial drop in the resource price may be strong enough to raise consumption above the baseline level at time zero. Fig. 3
describes the possible outcomes according to three scenarios. If the initial jump in consumption is downward, the entire
time profile of consumption for t40 is strictly below the baseline path – in which case, the switch to open access yields a
welfare loss. If the initial consumption jump is upward, the impact on welfare is positive if consumption remains forever
above the baseline path, and is generally ambiguous if consumption falls short of the baseline path at some finite time.
Since the model yields a closed-form solution for the equilibrium path after the regimes switch, we can assess the scope
of possible ambiguities in welfare effects analytically:
Proposition 8. The welfare change experienced by an economy that switches to the open access regime is
ρ UoaUprss
 ¼ αBmprss yprss|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
Initial price drop
 1y
oa
yprss
 
1þ φ
ρþν
 
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
Expenditure fall amplified by productivity slowdown
 α
ρþω 1
Soass
Sprss
 
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
Increased scarcity
ð49Þ
where we have defined φ κ=ν  θγ 2xssþ 1γ  with xss  limt-1γyðtÞ=nðtÞ, and ω ηBLoaHss with LoaHss  limt-1LoaH ðtÞ.
Fig. 3. Effects of a regime switch from full property rights to open access at time t¼0. Scenario I: welfare loss (consumption is always below the baseline
level). Scenario II: welfare gain (consumption is always above the baseline level). Scenario III: ambiguous welfare effect.
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initial drop in the resource price is large enough to compensate for the negative effects induced by (i) the instantaneous fall
in expenditure due to the destruction of the flow of resource rents; (ii) the transitional slowdown of TFP growth induced by
reduced expenditure; (iii) the gradual increase in resource scarcity. This result suggests a more general conclusion that
abstracts from the experiment of regime switching: full property rights improve welfare relative to open access if the utility
cost induced by positive resource rents is more than offset by the static gains generated by higher expenditure and the
dynamic gains induced by faster (transitional) productivity growth.
It should be clear that our results concerning the welfare effects of property-right regimes depend crucially on the
endogenous nature of both the resource price and the productivity growth rate. This property differentiates our analysis
from the traditional resource economics literature, which typically employs partial equilibrium models.
4.4. Numerical simulations: parallel paths and regime switching
This subsection presents a quantitative assessment of our model with particular focus on three questions. First, what is
the dominant source of welfare differentials between the two regimes if we assume identical initial conditions? Second,
assuming a failure of property rights enforcement, is the switch to open access welfare-reducing under plausible parameter
values? Third, what are the dynamics of endogenous variables assuming an opposite regime switch, from open access to full
property rights?
The first question highlights the main difference between our theory and partial equilibrium models. Since both resource
harvesting and aggregate productivity are endogenous in our analysis, different regimes of property rights yield different
welfare levels via the three channels emphasized in expression (45): the size of the market, the cost of resource inputs and
TFP. We compute for each regime the equilibrium path from t¼0 to t-1 starting from the same initial conditions
(Sð0Þ;nð0Þ; Zð0Þ) and assuming identical parameters. These parallel paths show differences in economics outcomes arising
only from differences in property rights regimes. Quantitatively, the key channel of such differences is TFP growth rather
than to the resource price drag (cf. expression (46) above).
To tackle the second and third questions we depart from the method of “parallel paths” and run two further simulations,
respectively labelled “switch to open access” and “ switch to full property rights”. In both cases, the switch to the new
regime occurs starting from the long-run equilibrium of the old regime. The simulation “switch to open access”
complements our theoretical results in Section 4.3 and shows the extent to which the collapse of full property rights
implies a welfare loss. The simulation “switch to full property rights” clarifies what are the dynamics of endogenous
variables in the opposite case where the economy abandons open access.
All simulations use the following set of parameter values. The input elasticities in production of the natural resource and
of manufacturing goods are, respectively, α¼ 0:15 and γ ¼ 0:35, reflecting conventional empirical estimates for resource-
rich countries. Total labor is L¼1 and the utility discount rate is ρ¼4%. In the resource sector we set η¼ 3%, B¼0.15 and
S ¼ 50. The technological parameters determining innovation rates are set so as to generate a long-run growth rate of
consumption of 2% per year: δ¼ 0:1, κ ¼ 0:32, θ¼ 0:5, ψ ¼ 2:5, ϕ¼ 1. The initial conditions vary according to the exercise, as
described below.
4.4.1. Simulation 1 – parallel paths
This simulation calculates for each regime the equilibrium path from t¼0 to t-1 starting from the same initial
condition: Sð0Þ ¼ 23:65, nð0Þ ¼ 0:0725, Zð0Þ ¼ 1. Table 1 reports the associated steady-state values of the relevant
endogenous variables, along with calculated present-value welfare.
Fig. 4 shows the equilibrium paths. The quantitative exercise illustrates nicely the forces highlighted in the qualitative
analysis. Initially the open access regime features more harvesting and a lower resource price. However, over time the
resource becomes more expensive than in the property rights regime. Given the common initial condition, the resource
Table 1
Long-run values in the simulation “ Parallel Paths”.
Regime yss Sss Hss PH 1ð Þ nss gss U
Full Property Rights 1.090 22.02 0.37 0.44 0.085 0.02 113.1
Open Access 1.036 11.14 0.26 0.60 0.081 0.02 107.6
Fig. 4. Simulation results – Parallel Paths. The equilibrium paths of the relevant variables under full property rights and open access are depicted with bold
lines and dotted lines, respectively.
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economy grows faster. Such difference in TFP growth explains the bulk of the quantitative difference in the consumption
paths because the difference in resource price drag is very small. It is worth re-iterating the key point of this exercise:
Fig. 5. Simulation results – Switch to Open Access. The equilibrium paths of the relevant variables under full property rights (baseline path) and open
access (actual path) are depicted with bold lines and dotted lines, respectively.
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differences due solely to access rights. The next two exercises, in contrast, quantify the effects of moving from one regime to
the other and thus do not hold everything but the access rights constant since in each case the dynamics features a different
initial condition.4.4.2. Simulation 2 – switch to open access
In this simulation the economy is initially in the long-run equilibrium with full property rights and, at time t¼0,
experiences a permanent switch to the open access regime. From the values reported in Table 1, we thus have the initial
conditions Soað0Þ ¼ 22:02 and noað0Þ ¼ 0:085, keeping Zoað0Þ ¼ 1 without loss of generality. Fig. 5 depicts the equilibrium path
Fig. 6. Simulation results – Switch to Full Property Rights. The equilibrium paths of the relevant variables under full property rights (actual path) and open
access (baseline path) are depicted with bold lines and dotted lines, respectively.
N. Suphaphiphat et al. / European Economic Review 76 (2015) 125–151140with open access, which is followed from t¼0 onwards, and the baseline path with full property rights, i.e., the path that the
economy would have followed if the regime switch had not occurred.
The consumption gap is negative between t¼0 and t¼2 because immediately after the switch there is more harvesting
and more production. The effect is quantitatively small, however (it not very evident in Fig. 5 because of the scale but it
exists). This result illustrates numerically what we have called Scenario III in our theoretical analysis of Section 4.3 (see
Fig. 3), namely that upon switching to open access consumption jumps instantaneously up but, due to the associated
productivity slowdown, it then goes below the baseline level. Recall that in this scenario the sign of the welfare change is
generally ambiguous. In this numeric simulation we find that the switch to open access is welfare-reducing since
UprðbaselineÞ ¼ 104:7499:7¼Uoa:
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welfare reducing as long as crucial parameters like α and γ are kept within ranges that are empirically plausible for modern
industrialized economies, i.e., αo0:2 and γ40:2. However, for higher values of α and/or lower values of γ – which may be
plausible for regions or (less industrialized) countries where production is heavily dependent on resources – it seems
possible that the switch to open access becomes welfare improving.4.4.3. Simulation 3 – switch to full property rights
The last simulation assumes that the economy is initially in the long-run equilibrium with open access. The switch at
time t¼0 to the regime with full property rights thus features the initial conditions Sprð0Þ ¼ 11:14 and nprð0Þ ¼ 0:081, with
Zprð0Þ ¼ 1. Fig. 6 depicts the equilibrium path followed from t¼0 onwards, and the baseline path with open access as a
reference benchmark. Although on impact harvesting falls, during the transition both harvesting and the resource stock are
increasing, eventually converging to higher values. Because of these dynamics, the resource price initially rises and then
gradually falls to a lower level. This evolution of the resource sector drives a gradual expansion of the market for
manufacturing goods, which, in turn, drives a temporary acceleration of TFP and consumption. The temporary acceleration
of consumption growth drives the rise in welfare.5. Conclusion
This paper analyzed the impact of different regimes of access rights to renewable natural resources on sustainability
conditions, innovation rates and welfare levels in a Schumpeterian model of endogenous growth. The crucial difference
between open access and full property rights is that, in the former, the economy lacks a price signal of scarcity capable of
inducing an adaptive response of resource extractors to the changing habitat. Consequently, the critical condition for long-
run sustainability is always more restrictive under open access: the economy might experience the Tragedy of the Commons
under open access and sustained economic growth under full property rights.
Full property rights yield positive rents from harvesting and therefore higher expenditure relative to open access: the
bigger market size induces faster productivity growth during the transition via both horizontal and vertical innovations.
However, positive rents also imply that the resource price is lower under open access given the same resource stock.
Consequently, a failure in property-rights enforcement that induces a regime switch to open access generates negative
transitional effects via slower productivity growth but also ambiguous level effects on consumption because reduced
resource prices mitigate the impact of lower expenditures. The closed-form solution delivered by the model shows that
switching to open access is welfare reducing if the utility gain generated by the initial drop in the resource price is more
than offset by the static and dynamic losses induced by reduced expenditure.
The crucial role played by endogenous prices and endogenous productivity growth in our conclusions confirms that a
proper understanding of the relationship between long-term sustainability and property-right regimes requires a full
general equilibrium analysis. In particular, the vertical structure of production that characterizes our model implies that
prospects for sustainability hinge on the link between price formation in upstream extraction/harvesting and the incentives
to innovate faced by downstream industries: this topic deserves further research at both the theoretical and the empirical
levels.Acknowledgments
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or IMF policy.Appendix A
Manufacturing sector (incumbents): maximization problem: Using the demand schedule (4) and the technology (5), the
incumbent firm's profit equals
ΠXi ¼
γPYHαL
β
Y
PXi
" #1=ð1γÞ
PXiWZθi
h i
WLZiWϕ: ðA:1Þ
The firm maximizes (8) subject to (A.1) and (6)-(7), using PXi and LZi as control variables, firm-specific knowledge Zi as the
state variable, taking public knowledge K as given. The current-value Hamiltonian is
Lxi ΠXi ¼
γPYHαL
β
Y
PXi
" #1=ð1γÞ
PXiWZθi
h i
WLZiWϕþλxi  κKLZi; ðA:2Þ
N. Suphaphiphat et al. / European Economic Review 76 (2015) 125–151142where λi
x
is the dynamic multiplier associated to (6). Since the Hamiltonian is linear in LZi, we have a bang-bang solution. The
necessary conditions for maximization read
1¼ 1
1γ
PXiWZθi
PXi
" #
; ðA:3Þ
λxi  κKWr0 ðo0 if LZi ¼ 0; ¼ 0 if LZi40Þ; ðA:4Þ
ðrþδÞ  λxi  _λ
x
i ¼ θ  XiWZθ1i : ðA:5Þ
Condition (A.3) follows from ∂Lx=∂PXi ¼ 0 and yields the standard mark-up rule
PXi ¼
1
γ
WZθi : ðA:6Þ
Condition (A.4) is the Kuhn–Tucker condition for R&D investment: in an interior solution, the marginal cost of employing
labor in vertical R&D activity (W) equals the marginal benefit of accumulating knowledge (λxi κK). Condition (A.5) is the
costate equation for knowledge: with strict equality in (A.4), substitution of both λxi ¼W=ðκKÞ and (A.6) in (A.5) yields
rþδ¼ γθ  XiPXi
W
 κK
Zi
þ
_W
W

_K
K
: ðA:7Þ
Manufacturing sector (incumbents): symmetry: The symmetry of the equilibrium is established in detail in Peretto (1998:
Proposition 1) and Peretto and Connolly (2007). Applying the same proof to the present model, the mark-up rule (A.6) is
invariant across varieties and implies the same price PXi, the same quantity Xi, and the same employment in production LXi
for each iA ½0;n. Therefore, we can combine (A.3) and (A.6) to write each firm's market share as in expression (9) in the
main text. Concerning the knowledge stock, from (7) and (6), the equilibrium growth rate under symmetry is
_K=K ¼ _Z i=Zi ¼ _Z=Z ¼ κ  LZi; ðA:8Þ
where we can substitute LZ ¼ nLZi to obtain
_Z
Z
¼ κ  LZ
n
: ðA:9Þ
Manufacturing sector (entry): derivation of (12): Given a constant death rate of firms δ, the mass of entrants in each instant
equals the gross variation in the mass of firms _nþδn. This implies that total labor employed in entry activities equals
LN ¼ LNi _nþδn
 
, and Eq. (10) may be written as
WLN ¼ _nþδn
 
ψPXiXi: ðA:10Þ
Rearranging terms, we have
_n
n
¼ WLN
ψnPXiXi
δ; ðA:11Þ
where we can substitute (9) to obtain (12).
General equilibrium: derivation of (22): In both regimes of access rights – see the Hamiltonians (19) and (20) – the
household problem yields the necessary conditions
1=C ¼ λaPY ; ðA:12Þ
_λa ¼ λaðρrÞ; ðA:13Þ
from which we obtain the standard Keynes–Ramsey rule (22).
General equilibrium: derivation of (23): Time-differentiating (8) yields (23).
General equilibrium: derivation of (24): Combining (9) with (11), we obtain (24).
General equilibrium: derivation of (25): Substituting (A.8) in (A.7) yields
_Z
Z
¼
_W
W
þκθγ2  PYY
Wn
 rþδ : ðA:14Þ
Setting W¼1 in (A.14) yields Eq. (25) in the text.
General equilibrium: derivation of (26): Time-differentiating the free entry condition (24), we obtain
_V i
Vi
¼
_PY
PY
þ
_Y
Y
 _n
n
: ðA:15Þ
Substituting (A.15) in (23) to eliminate _V i=Vi yields
rþδþ _n
n
¼
_PY
PY
þ
_Y
Y
þΠXi
Vi
ðA:16Þ
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_n
n
¼ΠXi
Vi
ρδ: ðA:17Þ
Substituting (A.6) and (A.9) in the definition of profits ΠXi, we have
ΠXi ¼ γ 1γ
   PYY
n
WϕW1
κ
_Z
Z
: ðA:18Þ
Substituting (A.18) in (A.17), and using (24) to eliminate Vi, we have
_n
n
¼ 1γ
ψ
W n
ψγPYY
 ϕþ1
κ
_Z
Z
" #
ρδ;
which reduces to (26) for W¼1.
General equilibrium: derivation of (27): Substituting A¼ψγ  PYY from (24), as well as Y¼C, in the wealth constraint (18),
we obtain
_PY
PY
þ
_Y
Y
¼ rþ Ly
ψγ  yþ
ΠS
ψγ  y: ðA:19Þ
The Keynes–Ramsey rule (22) then yields
y 1ψγρ ¼ LþΠS; ðA:20Þ
which yields (27) in the text.
Equilibrium under open access: derivation of (28) and (29): Under open access, normalizingW  1 and recalling expression
(18), the Hamiltonian (19) reads
Loa  log Coaþλoaa  roaAoaþLPoaY Coaþ PoaH BSoa1
   LoaH ; ðA:21Þ
where Coa and LH
oa
are control variables and Apr is the only state variable. The necessary conditions for maximization are
1=Coa ¼ λoaa PoaY ; ðA:22Þ
PoaH BS
oa ¼ 1; ðA:23Þ
_λ
oa
a ¼ λoaa  ρroa
 
: ðA:24Þ
From (A.23), we have PoaH BS
oa ¼ 1⟹ΠoaS ¼ 0, which is expression (28) in the text. Substituting (28) in (27), we have
PoaY Y
oa ¼ L 1ψγρ 1; ðA:25Þ
which, substituted into the Keynes–Ramsey rule (22), yields roa ¼ ρ.
Equilibrium under open access: proof of Proposition 1: Combining (28) with (3), we obtain (30). Substituting (30) into (13),
we obtain the differential equation (31) which converges to the unique steady state
lim
t-1
Soa tð Þ ¼ S=η

 
 η αBL
1ψγρ
 
:
Imposing the non-negativity restriction on physical quantities SoaZ0 determines the critical threshold reported in (31).
Equilibrium under open access: proof of Proposition 2: As noted in the main text, Proposition 2 assumes that innovation
activities are operative in each instant: that is, the economy uses positive amounts of labor in vertical R&D and entry
activities (LZ40 and LX40) implying positive rates of public knowledge growth ( _Z ðtÞ40) and of gross entry
(ð _nðtÞ=nðtÞÞþδ40). A detailed analysis of the implied restrictions on parameters is reported at the end of this Appendix.
Expression (33) is obtained by substituting y¼ yoa and roa ¼ ρ from (29) into Eq. (25). Substituting (33) into (26) yields (34),
which is dynamically stable around the unique positive steady state noass  limt-1noaðtÞ ¼ ~noa.
Equilibrium under Full Property Rights: the Hotelling rule: Under full property rights, normalizing W  1 and recalling
expression (18), the Hamiltonian (20) reads
Lpr  log Cprþλpra  rprAprþLPprY CprþΠprS
 þλprs  _Spr ;
that is
Lpr  log Cprþλpra  rprAprþLPprY CprþΠprS Spr ; LprH
  
þλprs  G Spr
 Hpr Spr ; LprH  ; ðA:26Þ
where Cpr and LH
pr
are the control variables, Apr and Spr are the state variables, and the functions
ΠS S
pr ; LprH
  PprH BSpr1   LprH ; ðA:27Þ
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  ηSpr  1 Spr=S
 h i; ðA:28Þ
H Spr ; LprH
  BLprH Spr ; ðA:29Þ
directly follow from definitions (16), (14) and (15). The necessary conditions for maximization are
1=Cpr ¼ λpra PprY ; ðA:30Þ
∂ΠS Spr ; L
pr
H
 
∂LprH
¼ λ
pr
s
λpra
 ∂H S
pr ; LprH
 
∂LprH
; ðA:31Þ
_λ
pr
a
λpra
¼ ρrpr ; ðA:32Þ
_λ
pr
s
λprs
¼ ρ∂G S
pr 
∂Spr
þ∂H S
pr ; LprH
 
∂Spr
λ
pr
a
λprs
∂ΠS Spr ; L
pr
H
 
∂Spr
; ðA:33Þ
along with the transversality conditions
lim
t-1
λpra ðtÞAprðtÞeρt ¼ 0; ðA:34Þ
lim
t-1
λprs ðtÞSprðtÞeρt ¼ 0: ðA:35Þ
Henceforth, we denote the marginal net rent from employing an additional unit of labor in harvesting as
Π 0S 
∂ΠS Spr ; L
pr
H
 
∂LprH
¼ PprH BSpr1
 ¼ΠS Spr ; LprH 
LprH
: ðA:36Þ
Time-differentiating (A.31), we obtain
_λ
pr
s
λprs

_λ
pr
a
λpra
¼
_Π
0
S
Π 0S

_S
pr
Spr
;
where we can substitute (A.32) and (A.33) to obtain
_Π
0
S
Π 0S
¼ rpr λ
pr
a
λprs
 ∂ΠS S
pr ; LprH
 
∂Spr
þ ∂G S
pr 
∂Spr
∂H S
pr ; LprH
 
∂Spr
" #

_S
pr
Spr
( )
: ðA:37Þ
Eq. (A.37) is a generalized Hotelling rule: an efficient harvesting plan requires that the growth rate of the marginal net rents
from resource harvesting equal the interest rate minus the term in curly brackets –which represents the shadow value of all
the positive feedback effects that a marginal increase in the resource stock induces on current rents and on future
consumption benefits from resource use. If the resource were non-renewable (η¼ 0 implies that ∂G=∂S¼ 0) and harvesting
costs were independent of the resource stock (∂H=∂S¼ 0), the term in curly brackets would be zero: in that case, Eq. (A.37)
would collapse to the basic Hotelling's (1931) rule _Π
0
S=Π
0
S ¼ _PH=PH ¼ rpr .
Equilibrium under Full Property Rights: derivation of (36) and (37): From (A.27) and (A.29), the first-order condition (A.31)
can be re-written as
λpra  PprH BSpr1
 ¼ λprs  BSpr ;
where we can substitute λpra ¼ 1= PprY Ypr
 
from (A.30), and multiply both sides by LH
pr
, to obtain
PprH BS
pr1   LprH ¼ λprs  BSprLprH  ypr ; ðA:38Þ
which yields expression (37) in the main text. The left-hand side of (A.38) equals current net rents from harvesting, ΠS
pr
.
Therefore, substituting Hpr ¼ BSprLprH from (15) into (A.38), we obtain Eq. (36) in the text.
Equilibrium under Full Property Rights: derivation of (38): From (27), we can rewrite the relation between expenditure and
resource rents as
ΠprS ðtÞ ¼ yprðtÞ 1ρψγ
 L: ðA:39Þ
Substituting ΠS
pr
in (A.39) by means of (36), we obtain
ypr tð Þ ¼ L
1ρψγλprs ðtÞHprðtÞ
; ðA:40Þ
that is Eq. (38) in the text. For future reference, notice that – using the resource demand schedule (3) – resource rents can
also be written as
Π jSðtÞ ¼ PjHðtÞHjðtÞLjHðtÞ ¼ αyjðtÞLjHðtÞ: ðA:41Þ
N. Suphaphiphat et al. / European Economic Review 76 (2015) 125–151 145Combining (A.39) with (A.41) under full property rights, it follows that
LLprH ðtÞ ¼ 1ρψγα
   yprðtÞ: ðA:42Þ
In any equilibrium with positive final output, we must have L4LprH ðtÞ and, consequently, the parameter restriction
1ρψγα40: ðA:43Þ
Equilibrium under Full Property Rights: proof of Proposition 3: The proof hinges on three steps: (i) the derivation of the
dynamic system (40) and (41); (ii) the proof of saddle-point stability; (iii) the proof of results (42).(i) Dynamic system: First, we derive Eq. (40). From (A.28) and (A.29), we have
∂G Spr
 
∂Spr
∂H S
pr ; LprH
 
∂Spr
¼ η2 η=S

 
 Spr BLprH : ðA:44Þ
From (A.30) and (A.27), we respectively have
λpra ¼ 1=ypr and
∂ΠS Spr ; L
pr
H
 
∂Spr
¼ PprH BLprH : ðA:45Þ
Substituting (A.44) and (A.45) into (A.33), as well as Hpr=Spr ¼ BLprH from (15), we have
_λ
pr
s
λprs
¼ ρηþ2 η=S

 
 Spr þHpr
Spr
 1
λprs
 P
pr
H H
pr
yprSpr
: ðA:46Þ
Substituting PH
pr
by means of (3), we obtain
_λ
pr
s
λprs
¼ ρηþ2 η=S

 
SprþH
pr
Spr
 1
λprs
 α
Spr
: ðA:47Þ
From (13) and (15), the growth rate of the resource stock is
_S
pr
Spr
¼ η η=S

 
SprH
pr
Spr
: ðA:48Þ
Eqs. (A.47) and (A.48) imply
_λ
pr
s
λprs
þ
_S
pr
Spr
¼ ρþ η=S

 
Spr α
λprs S
pr : ðA:49Þ
Eq. (A.49) can be transformed into a differential equation governing the shadow value of the resource stock, m λprs Spr ,
which depends on the resource stock
_m
m
¼ ρþ η=S

 
Spr tð Þ α
m
; ðA:50Þ
which is Eq. (40) in the text. We now derive (41). From (A.38), we have
PprH BS
pr ¼ 1þλprs Spr  Bypr : ðA:51Þ
Substituting PprH ¼ αypr=Hpr from (3) into (A.51), and using m λ
pr
s S
pr , we have
Spr
Hpr
¼ 1
αBypr
þm
α
: ðA:52Þ
Using (A.40) to substitute ypr in (A.52), we obtain
Spr
Hpr
¼
1ρψγm  H
pr
Spr
αBL
þm
α
;
which generates the second-order static equation
αBL
Spr
Hpr
 2
 1ρψγþBLm   Spr
Hpr
þm¼ 0: ðA:53Þ
Eq. (A.53) determines, at each point in time, the equilibrium stock-flow ratio Spr=Hpr for given m. The roots of (A.53) are
Spr
Hpr
¼
1ρψγþBLm7
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1ρψγþBLm 24αBLmq
2αBL
: ðA:54Þ
Notice that, in order to ensure a real value for Spr=Hpr , the term under the square root is constrained to be strictly
positive
1ρψγþBL m 24αBL m¼ 1ρψγ 2þ2 1ρψγ4α BLmþ BLmð Þ240: ðA:55Þ
1whic
1
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strictly positive labor (see (A.43) above) imply that HproBLSpr must hold in each instant in an equilibriumwith positive
harvesting and positive final production. Imposing this inequality in (A.54), we have
BLSpr
Hpr
¼
1ρψγþBLm7
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1ρψγþBLm 24αBLmq
2α
41: ðA:56Þ
The above inequality can only be satisfied by the solution exhibiting the plus sign in front of the square root.10 Inverting
the stock-flow ratio in (A.56), we can thus write
Hpr
Spr
¼Λ mð Þ ðA:57Þ
in each instant t in which there is an equilibrium with positive production, where
Λ mð Þ  2αBL
1ρψγþBL mþ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1ρψγþBL m 24αBL mq : ðA:58Þ
Notice that, given the restriction (A.55), (A.58) implies
Λ0 mð Þ  ∂ΛðmÞ
∂m
o0: ðA:59Þ
These results allow us to complete the autonomous two-by-two system: Eq. (40) is (A.50) above; substituting result
(A.57) into (A.48), we obtain (41).(ii) Saddle-point stability: The steady-state loci of system (40) and (41) are given by
_m tð Þ ¼ 0-Spr tð Þ ¼ S
η
 α
mðtÞρ
 
; ðA:60Þ
_S
pr
tð Þ ¼ 0-Spr tð Þ ¼ S
η
 ηΛ mðtÞð Þ : ðA:61Þ
The steady state mss; S
pr
ss
 
is therefore characterized by
Sprss ¼
S
η
 α
mss
ρ
 
; ðA:62Þ
Λ mssð Þ ¼ η η=S

 
Sprss : ðA:63Þ
Therefore, there exists a steady state with positive resource stock if and only if parameters are such that
msso
α
ρ
and Λ mssð Þoη: ðA:64Þ
Linearizing system (40) and (41) around the steady-state mss; S
pr
ss
 
, we have
_m=m
_S
pr
=Spr
 !
C
ς1  α=m2ss
 
ς2  η=S

 
ς3  Λ0 mssð Þ ς4   η=S

 
0
BB@
1
CCA
mmss
SprSprss
0
B@
1
CA;
where (recalling result (A.59) above), the coefficients have definite signs: ς140, ς240, ς340, ς4o0. These signs imply
ς4ς1ς2ς3
 
o0. As a consequence, the characteristic roots of the linearized system, given by the eigenvalues
ς1þς4
 
7
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ς1þς4
 24 ς4ς1ς2ς3 q
2
;
are necessarily real and of opposite sign. The steady state mss; S
pr
ss
 
thus displays saddle-point stability: given the initial
state Sprð0Þ ¼ S0, there is a unique trajectory determined by the jump variable mð0Þ driving the system towards
mss; S
pr
ss
 
. Ruling out explosive paths by standard arguments,11 the saddle-path determines a unique equilibrium path
which converges to a positive stationary level of the resource stock Sprss40 provided that the restrictions (A.64) are
satisfied.(iii) Steady states: Results (42) follow from the condition for positive steady-state resource stock implied by (41). If the
parameters are such that η4Λ mssð Þ, restrictions (A.64) are satisfied and saddle-point stability implies that mðtÞ; SprðtÞ
 
converge to the steady state mss; Sprss
 
with Sprss40 determined by (A.62) and (A.63): see Fig. 1, left graph. If parameters0 The proof of this statement is by contradiction: picking the solution with the minus sign, inequality (A.56) would imply 4α α 1ρψγ  40,
h is not possible because we would violate the parameter restriction (A.43).
1 Explosive paths would violate either the transversality condition limt-1mðtÞeρt ¼ 0 appearing in (A.35) or the intertemporal resource constraint (13).
N. Suphaphiphat et al. / European Economic Review 76 (2015) 125–151 147imply ηrΛ mssð Þ, instead, the steady state (A.62) and (A.63) is not feasible in view of restrictions (A.64) and the
dynamics generated by the loci (A.60) and (A.61) imply that mðtÞ; SprðtÞ  converge to a steady state with
limt-1S
prðtÞ ¼ 0 and limt-1mðtÞ ¼ α=ρ, as shown in Fig. 1, right graph.Equilibrium under Full Property Rights: proof of Proposition 4: As noted in the main text, Proposition 4 assumes that
innovation activities are operative in each instant (i.e., _Z ðtÞ40 and ð _nðtÞ=nðtÞÞþδ40: see the further details reported at the
end of this Appendix). The equilibrium growth rate of Zpr follows directly from (25), and can be substituted into (26) to
obtain
_nprðtÞ
nprðtÞ ¼
1γθγψ ðρþδÞ
ψ
 1
ψ
 n
prðtÞ
γyprðtÞ  ϕ
1
κ
 rprðtÞþδ  : ðA:65Þ
Defining ν ð1γθγψ ρþδ Þ=ψ and
~npr tð Þ  γypr tð Þ  1γθγψ ρþδ
 
ϕ1
κ
 rprðtÞþδ  ;
expression (A.65) reduces to
_nprðtÞ
nprðtÞ ¼ ν  1
nprðtÞ
~nprðtÞ
 
: ðA:66Þ
Having established that limt-1yprðtÞ ¼ yprss and limt-1rprðtÞ ¼ ρ in (43), the carrying capacity ~nprðtÞ is asymptotically
constant
lim
t-1
~npr tð Þ ¼ γyprss 
1γθγψ ρþδ 
ϕðρþδÞ  κ1 ;
implying that Eq. (A.66) is dynamically stable around the steady state limt-1nprðtÞ ¼ limt-1 ~nprðtÞ.
Long-Run Equilibria: proof of Proposition 5. The proof hinges on two steps: (a) proving that ηoa4ηpr , and (b) comparing
the three subcases (i)–(iii).(a) Proof that ηoa4ηpr . From (32) and (42), the difference between the critical levels ηoaηpr ¼ αBL=ð1ψγρÞΛ mssð Þ.
Substituting the definition of Λ mssð Þ from the third expression in (42), we have
ηoaηpr  αBL
1ψγρ  1
2 1ψγρ 
1ψγρþBLmssþ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1ρψγþBLmss
 24αBLmssq
2
64
3
75:
The term in square brackets is strictly positive if and only if 1ρψγ4α, a condition that surely holds given the
restriction (A.43).(b) Proof of subcases (i)-(iii): Considering subcase (i), suppose that ηproηoaoη. Then, both regimes yield positive stock in
the long run with the following property. From (32) and (42),
Soass Sprss ¼
S
η
 Λ mssð Þ αBL1ψγρ
 
¼ S
η
 ηprηoa o0;
because the last term is strictly negative (ηoa4ηpr). Hence, Sprss4S
oa
ss . Under full property rights, positive harvesting in
the long run implies a positive asymptotic shadow value of the resource stock: mss40 and Λ mssð Þ40. Consequently,
(29) and (43) yield yprss4yoa. Concerning the mass of firms, from (35) and (44), we have noass =n
pr
ss ¼ yoa=yprss , which implies
that nprss4noass . Considering subcase (ii), suppose that η
proηoηoa. Then, we have Sprss40 from (42) and Soass ¼ 0 from (32);
since the production function (1) implies that the resource is essential, resource exhaustion under open access yields
zero production/consumption under open access. Considering subcase (iii), suppose that ηoηproηoa. Then, we have
Sprss ¼ 0 from (42) and Soass ¼ 0 from (32) that imply zero production/consumption under both regimes.Equilibrium growth rates: derivation of (45). Symmetry in the manufacturing sector implies that final output (1) and the
market share of intermediates (9) can be re-written as Y ¼HαLβYnXγ and Xi ¼ γðPYY=nPXiÞ, respectively. Combining these two
expressions to eliminate X, and using the profit-maximizing conditions of the final sector (2) and (3) to eliminate H and LY,
we have
Y ¼HαLβYn1γ γ
PYY
PXi
 γ
¼ αPYY
PH
 α βPYY
W
 β
 n1γ γPYY
PX
 γ
:
Observing that Y drops out, and solving the above expression for PY, we obtain
PY ¼
1
ααββγγ
 PαH Wβ  n1þ γ  PγX :
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log C ¼ log ααββγγþ log y log PαHþ log n1 γ log WβPγX

 
:
Using the pricing rule (A.6) to eliminate PX, the above expression becomes
log C ¼ log ααββγγþ log y log PαHþ log n1 γ log Wβ 
1
γ
WZθi
 γ 
;
where, setting W¼1 and rearranging terms, we have
log C ¼ log ααββγ2γþ log y log PαHþ log n1γZθγ

 
:
Defining a  ααββγ2γ , the above expression yields (45) in the text.
Equilibrium growth rates: derivation of (46): Time-differentiating (45) and substituting _y=y by means of the Keynes–
Ramsey rule (22), we obtain (46).
Equilibrium growth rates: proof of Proposition 6: Propositions 2 and 4 imply the result of identical firm size in the long
run (47). Substituting (47) in (25), we obtain identical asymptotic rates of vertical innovation, limt-1 _Z ðtÞ=ZðtÞ
¼ κγθðγyss=nssÞ ρþδ
 
. Letting t-1 in expression (46), we obtain limt-1gðtÞ ¼ limt-1γθð _Z ðtÞ=ZðtÞÞ and therefore (48).
Resource price: proof of Proposition 7: From (28) and (37), the resource prices under the two regimes read
PoaH ¼
1
BSoa
and PprH ¼
1þBmypr
BSpr
:
For a given level of the resource stock SðtÞ ¼ ~S, the above expressions imply PoaH

S ¼ ~SoP
pr
H

S ¼ ~S because BmðtÞyprðtÞ40. In the
long-run equilibria of the two regimes, resource prices equal
lim
t-1
PoaH tð Þ ¼
1
BSoass
and lim
t-1
PprH tð Þ ¼
1þBmssyprss
BSprss
:
Consequently, the sign of the gap limt-1PoaH ðtÞ limt-1PprH ðtÞ is determined by the inequality 1=BSoass ≷ð1þBmssyprss Þ=BSprss ,
that is,
Sprss
Soass
≷1þBmssyprss : ðA:67Þ
Substituting Sss
oa
and Sss
pr
by (32) and (42), and eliminating yss
pr
by (43), the above expression reduces to
ηΛ mssð Þ
η αBL
1ψγρ
≷1þ BmssL
1ψγρmssΛ mssð Þ
: ðA:68Þ
The sign is generally ambiguous because, defining Υ  1ψγρ and ΔΛ mssð Þ, we can rewrite (A.68) as
ΥmssΔ
 |ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
positive
αBLΔΥ |ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
positive
 mssBLð Þ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
positive
ηΥαBL |ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
positive
≷0:
Regime switch: proof Proposition 8: Rewrite (45) as
log CðtÞ ¼ log aþ log yðtÞαlog PHðtÞþ log TðtÞ; ðA:69Þ
where we have defined total factor productivity as
TFP¼ TðtÞ  nðtÞð Þ1γðZðtÞÞθγ : ðA:70Þ
Starting from (A.69) and (A.70), the derivation of expression (49) involves three intermediate steps: deriving explicit
expressions for (i) TFP, (ii) the resource price, and (iii) present-value utility, under the regime of open access.(i) Total factor productivity: For future reference, we denote the rate of vertical innovation by Z^ ðtÞ  _Z ðtÞ=ZðtÞ, its asymptotic
value by Z^ ss  limt-1Z^ ðtÞ, and the long-run growth rate of the economy by gss  limt-1gðtÞ ¼ θγZ^ ðtÞ. Under open
access, the TFP term can be re-expressed as follows. By definition
log Toa tð Þ ¼ θγlog Z0þθγ
Z t
0
Z^
oa
sð Þdsþ 1γ log n0þ 1γ log noaðtÞn0
 
;
where we can add and subtract Z^ ss from Z^ ðtÞ, obtaining
log T tð Þ ¼ log Zθγ0 n
1γ
0

 
þgss  tþθγ
Z t
0
Z^ ðsÞ Z^ ss
h i
dsþ 1γ log nðtÞ
n0
 
: ðA:71Þ
Denoting xjðtÞ  γyjðtÞ=njðtÞ, and recalling that yoaðtÞ ¼ yoa is constant over time, we have _noa=noa ¼  _xoa=xoa. Therefore,
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 
, the solution of which is
xoaðtÞ ¼ xoa0 eνtþxoass 1eνt
 
: ðA:72Þ
Result (A.72) implies that
θγ
Z t
0
Z^ sð Þ Z^ n

 
ds¼ κ θγ 2 Z t
0
x tð Þxssð Þ ds
¼ κ θγ
 2xss
ν
x0
xss
1
 
1eνt : ðA:73Þ
Also, from the solution (34), we have
nðtÞ
n0
¼
1þ nss
n0
1
 
1þ nss
n0
1
 
eνt
;
where we can take logarithms and approximate the resulting terms to obtain
log
nðsÞ
n0
 
¼ nss
n0
1
 
1eνt : ðA:74Þ
Observing that ðnss=n0Þ1¼ ðx0=xssÞ1, results (A.73) and (A.74) yield
log T tð Þ ¼ log Zθγ0 n
1 γ
0

 
þgss  tþφ
nss
n0
1
 
1eνt ; ðA:75Þ
where we have defined φ ðκ θγ 2xss=νÞþ 1γ .(ii) Resource price: Since open access implies a constant harvesting rate, the resource stock follows the logistic process
_S
oaðtÞ
SoaðtÞ ¼ω  1
SoaðtÞ
Soass
 
; ðA:76Þ
where, denoting by LHss ¼ limt-1LHðtÞ, we have defined the constants ω ηBLHss and Soass  S  ðηBLHssÞ=η. The
solution of (A.76) is
SðtÞ
S0
¼
1þ Sss
S0
1
 
1þ Sss
S0
1
 
eωt
;
where we can take logarithms and approximate the resulting terms to obtain
log
SðtÞ
S0
¼ Sss
S0
1
 
1eωt :
Since (28) implies  logðPoaH ðtÞ=PoaH ð0ÞÞ ¼ logðSðtÞ=S0Þ, we have
 logP
oa
H ðtÞ
PoaH ð0Þ
¼ Sss
S0
1
 
1eωt : ðA:77Þ(iii) Present-value utility: Under open access, expression (A.69) reads
log Coa tð Þ ¼ log aþ log y
oa
PoaH ð0Þ
 α
 !
αlog P
oa
H ðtÞ
PoaH ð0Þ
 
þ log Toa tð Þ: ðA:78Þ
Without loss of generality, let us normalize log aþ log Zθγ0 n
1 γ
0

 
 0.12 Substituting (A.75) and (A.77) in (A.78), we
obtain
log Coa tð Þ ¼ log yoaαlog PoaH 0ð Þþgss  t
þα S
oa
ss
S0
1
 
1eωt þφ noass
n0
1
 
1eνt : ðA:79Þ
Substituting (A.79) in the welfare functional (17), and integrating, we obtain
Uoa ¼ 1
ρ
log yoaαlog PoaH 0ð Þþ
gss
ρ
þ α
ρþω
Soass
S0
1
 
þ φ
ρþν
noass
n0
1
  
; ðA:80Þ
which is the level of welfare associated to the transition dynamics under open access given generic initial conditions S0, Z0, n0.2 This normalization only simplifies the notation and does not affect the results.
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On the basis of these results, we consider the initial conditions at time zero as determined by the steady state of the full
would follow if full property rights were maintained after time zero is given by
log CprðtÞ ¼ log aþ log yprss αlog PprH;ssþ log TprðtÞ; ðA:81Þ
where TFP grows at the asymptotic rate gss in each instant after time zero. Consequently, the baseline present-value welfare
generated by the baseline consumption path (A.81) equals
Uprss ¼
1
ρ
log yprss αlog PprH
 
ssþ
gss
ρ
 
: ðA:82Þ
Taking the difference between (A.80) and (A.82), we obtain expression (49).
Further details: operativeness of innovation activities: Both Propositions 2 and 4 assume that innovation activities are
operative in each instant – that is, _Z ðtÞ=ZðtÞ40 and ð _nðtÞ=nðtÞÞþδ40. The parameter restrictions that guarantee this
outcome can be derived as follows. For simplicity, consider the open access regime. From (29), substitute yoa ¼ yoa and
roa ¼ ρ into Eq. (25): the non-negativity constraint on firm-specific R&D implies
_Z
oaðtÞ
ZoaðtÞ ¼
κθγ  γy
oa
noaðtÞ  ρþδ
 
if noa tð Þonoa  κθγ
2
ρþδ y
oa
0 if noaðtÞZnoa
8><
>: : ðA:83Þ
Substituting this result in (26), we obtain
_noaðtÞ
noaðtÞ þδ¼
1γψρθγ
ψ
ϕ ρþδ
   κ1
ψγL 1ψγρ 1  noa tð Þ if noaðtÞonoa
1γψρ
ψ
 ϕ
ψγL 1ψγρ 1  noa tð Þ if noaðtÞZnoa
8>><
>>:
: ðA:84Þ
Imposing the non-negativity constraint on employment in entry, LN, expression (A.84) implies two threshold levels on the
mass of firms. First, when _Z
oaðtÞ40, there exists
noaT1 
γL 1γψρθγ 
1ψγρ  ϕ ρþδ κ1 ;
such that
noa tð Þonoa and _n
oaðtÞ
noaðtÞ þδ¼
1γψρθγ
ψ
 ϕ ρþδð Þκ
 1
ψγL 1ψγρð Þ 1  n
oa tð Þ if noaðtÞonoaT1
0 if noaðtÞZnoaT1
8><
>: : ðA:85Þ
Second, when _Z
oaðtÞ ¼ 0, there exists noaT2  ðγ 1γψρ
 
LÞ=ðϕ 1ψγρ Þ, such that
noa tð ÞZnoa and _n
oaðtÞ
noaðtÞ þδ¼
1γψρ
ψ
 ϕ
ψγL 1ψγρ 1  noa tð Þ if noaðtÞonoaT2
0 if noaðtÞZnoaT2
8><
>: : ðA:86Þ
It follows from (A.85) and (A.86) that a sufficient condition for positive gross entry is
noaðtÞomin noaT1;noaT2
 
: ðA:87Þ
Provided that (A.87) holds, the mass of firms obeys the logistic process described in (A.84). Proposition 2 thus assumes
implicitly that condition (A.87) is satisfied. This assumption is without loss of generality: because the logistic process (34)
always converges to a finite steady state, satisfying (A.87) is equivalent to imposing restrictions on the exogenous
parameters appearing in (A.84) and on the initial condition noað0Þ. The alternative cases in which parameters yield no
horizontal R&D are a less interesting special case because the model collapses to an economy with vertical R&D only.
Appendix B. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this paper can be found in the online version at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
euroecorev.2015.02.003.References
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